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Medicare is one of the largest social programs in the world. Did organized industry favor 
Medicare’s passage in 1965? If it did, this would represent powerful evidence in favor of the 
theory that social programs typically require cross-class alliances to pass, such as alliances 
between business and labor. However, in a previous article in this journal, I argued that 
answering questions about political actors’ preferences—such as whether organized industry 
favored Medicare’s passage—can be surprisingly difficult due to the “problem of preferences”; 
that is, political actors might misrepresent their true policy preferences for many reasons.1 For 
example, when their ideal proposals are not politically feasible, political actors may wish to 
bolster support for a more politically viable alternative to a disliked proposal—even if they do 
not truly support this alternative to the status quo.2 To better understand political actors’ true 
policy preferences, I argued, scholars should trace how those actors’ expressed preferences 
change as a function of their strategic context—just as scholars seeking to understand the impact 
of any other variable trace the effects of changes in it. 
I illustrated this argument in the case of Medicare’s passage. With evidence from eight 
historical archives, original interviews, and previously sealed Congressional hearings, my article 
showed that a broad spectrum of business organizations and allies—including House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills, Ranking Member John Byrnes, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and its state equivalents, and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)—
shifted their expressed positions on Medicare as their strategic contexts changed. Most 
importantly, after the decisive 1964 election gave Democrats large majorities in Congress, it was 
clear Medicare would pass in some form. As a result, many businesses and business 
organizations that had expressed complete opposition to Medicare in any form just months 
before turned on a dime and expressed sympathy for the proposal in early 1965, focusing their 
energies on arguing for modifications or more palatable alternatives to insuring the aged.3 I 
likewise traced how key business-friendly politicians John Byrnes and Wilbur Mills changed 
their expressed preferences and legislative strategies after the 1964 election and as they dealt 
with different audiences, offering a clear picture that neither perceived business interests as 
favoring the Medicare plan that passed. The correct conclusion to draw from the evidence, I 
argued, was that “key business groups and their allies did not truly favor the [Medicare] 
program” that Congress passed to the status quo.4 
As an example of how political actors’ preferences might be misunderstood if one did not 
attend to the problem of preferences, I also considered how a 2006 essay by Peter Swenson 
interpreted some of this evidence.5 In this 2006 essay, Swenson noted that some business allies 
supported some Medicare-like proposals in 1965. Swenson therefore concluded that Medicare 
was “hardly a victory of labor and liberals over big business” and instead passed due to a “cross-
class” alliance between business and traditional liberal forces.6 However, I showed that the very 
same business-aligned politicians and organizations that Swenson argued had entered into a 
cross-class alliance to pass Medicare had in fact expressed total opposition to Medicare when its 
passage was less assured just prior to the November 1964 election. It is implausible that 
business’s true policy preferences or interests shifted radically enough over the course of these 
few months. Moreover, much other evidence I presented was likewise consistent with business 
and its allies primarily seeking to limit the unacceptability of whatever Medicare program would 
pass, not truly preferring Medicare’s passage. Thus, I argued, Swenson’s essay came to the 
incorrect conclusion that business favored Medicare’s passage to the status quo because it failed 
to attend to the problem of preferences when interpreting business behavior in 1965.7 This 
helped demonstrate my broader argument that scholars must attend to the problem of preferences 
when seeking to understand whose political preferences are really being satisfied when laws 
change. 
I appreciate the editors of SAPD inviting me to comment on Swenson’s new article, 
“Misrepresented Interests,” which seeks to further critique the view that organized industry did 
not favor Medicare’s passage.8 Swenson’s article claims to locate “extensive evidence” of 
“enormous division within business” about Medicare and “a great deal of support from large and 
powerful corporations” for it. However, careful readers of Swenson’s article will be disappointed 
that there is little such evidence his article adduces. In this article, I provide a closer inspection of 
the empirical evidence Swenson’s article draws on and argue that this evidence does little to 
prove its claims. I also provide a broader discussion of how to ascertain business’s interests and 
political preferences. 
First, Swenson’s article again neglects the problem of preferences—failing to consider 
the strategic context from which its evidence was drawn. For example, when business groups 
made statements to Congress asking for specific changes to the Medicare bill, Swenson’s article 
interprets their failure to express opposition to the overall bill as implicit support or indifference 
to it. However, the historical record shows that just months before, when the political 
environment was less favorable to Medicare, many of these same individuals openly opposed the 
very concept of Medicare. 
Swenson’s article also reads far too much into the other limited evidence it does present. 
For example, the article implies that because some businesspeople who had favored Nixon over 
Kennedy in 1960 then favored LBJ over Goldwater in 1964, they must have been attracted to 
LBJ’s Medicare proposal—even though Kennedy favored Medicare, too, and even though none 
of the sources that Swenson’s article cites name Medicare as a reason for these shifts. Nearly all 
of the evidence Swenson’s article presents suffers from similar fatal shortcomings upon closer 
inspection. For example, in support of “enormous division” within business, Swenson’s article 
cites secondary work that relies on unsourced anecdotes that in fact suggest such division was 
atypical. In all, then, there is little in Swenson’s article that should change conventional wisdom 
about Medicare as largely not supported by business. 
Swenson also argues that “facts about economic interests”9 should be regarded as more 
reliable than facts about political actors’ revealed policy preferences, given the difficulty in 
ascertaining actors’ true policy preferences. However, as I discuss, it is often even more difficult 
to understand what is in actors’ economic interests—as exemplified by the fact that it remains 
unclear, and would be extremely difficult to definitively determine, whether Medicare was in 
large business’s interest or not. 
In the pages that follow, I will summarize Swenson’s article’s claims and the flaws in 
them, and then conclude with a broader discussion of the broader theoretical and methodological 
issues at hand. 
 
<H1>Swenson’s Claims 
<H2>Swenson: The NAM’s position is uninformative about broader business sentiment. 
Swenson’s article implies that the core of my 2012 article’s case rested on demonstrating the 
NAM’s opposition to Medicare, implying that my 2012 article therefore provides little 
evidentiary value because the NAM was unrepresentative of broader business sentiment. 
However, Swenson’s article neglects to mention that the reason my 2012 article considered the 
NAM as one of several cases was because Swenson had previously held up an NAM official’s 
statements about Medicare as key evidence that Medicare was business-supported. Indeed, a 
statement by an NAM official constituted the core of Swenson’s own previous argument about 
business support for Medicare. 
In particular, in a 2006 essay, Swenson discussed a letter a NAM official sent to Ways 
and Means Committee Ranking Member Republican John Byrnes. The letter deemed Byrnes’s 
“Bettercare” proposal worthy of “strong[] support by industry.”10 Swenson notes that Byrnes 
distributed this NAM “letter of approval” to fellow Republicans on the Ways and Means 
Committee.11 Swenson interprets these events as indicating that business preferred Byrnes’s 
proposal to the status quo and that Byrnes was taking steps to “assure[] himself and then fellow 
Republicans that what they were doing was good for business.” Byrnes’s NAM-approved 
“Bettercare” proposal was incorporated into the final Medicare bill, meaning a business-
supported proposal was present in the final act. Swenson therefore concluded that Medicare was 
“hardly a victory of labor and liberals over big business” and instead represented a “cross-class” 
alliance.12 
My 2012 article pointed out two issues with this reasoning.13 First, everyone at the time 
understood that Byrnes’s proposal was intended as a less unpalatable “substitute” for the Johnson 
administration’s proposal, not as the addition that Wilbur Mills made it (to Byrnes’s surprise). 
That the NAM supported Byrnes’s efforts to offer an alternative to President Lyndon Johnson’s 
Medicare plan does not indicate that the NAM truly preferred this alternative to the status quo, 
only that it preferred this alternative to Medicare. Second, the NAM likely did not prefer it to the 
status quo, as the NAM explicitly opposed any form of medical care for the aged whatsoever 
before the 1964 election necessitated Medicare opponents offer an alternative (see Table 2 in my 
2012 article).14 
Swenson’s latest article implies that my demonstration of this second point about the 
flaws in Swenson’s evidence about the NAM’s preferences in fact constituted the core of my 
own case that business opposed Medicare, implying that I mistook the NAM to be representative 
of business at large. My article in fact considered a wide array of evidence and not only evidence 
from the NAM. Ironically, however, Swenson’s own previous essay does regard an NAM 
representative’s “letter of approval” for “Bettercare” as the key smoking gun indicative of 
business support for Medicare in general.15 As a result, if we accept Swenson’s latest article’s 
claim that NAM officials’ views were in fact uninformative about broader business sentiment, 
one of the few slender reeds supporting Swenson’s own case that business favored Medicare—an 
NAM official’s support for Byrnes’s “Bettercare”—collapses. 
<H2>Swenson: That twenty-two state Chambers of Commerce did not sign onto a letter 
from the Council of State Chambers of Commerce opposing Medicare supports the 
presence of “enormous division within business.” 
Swenson is right to point out that the Chamber of Commerce was regarded as more 
representative of broader business sentiment than the NAM and engaged in extensive efforts to 
ensure that its stances reflected the will of its members.16 Moreover, Swenson does not dispute 
the clear historical record that the national Chamber of Commerce and a majority of State 
Chambers of Commerce opposed Medicare. However, he notes that twenty-two state Chambers 
of Commerce did not sign on to a statement the Council of State Chambers of Commerce made 
to Congress opposing Medicare. Swenson implies that their absence suggests the presence of 
division among state Chambers of Commerce. 
Those hoping Swenson’s article will make good on its promise to provide “extensive 
evidence” of “enormous division within business” with this example, however, will be 
disappointed to learn that Swenson’s article does not document any such division or support 
among even one of these twenty-two state chambers. Moreover, other evidence shows that many 
of these twenty-two state chambers clearly opposed Medicare: For example, cursory searches of 
newspapers and the Congressional record reveal that within the three years prior to Medicare’s 
passage, state chambers or their spokespeople in California,17 Illinois,18 and Louisiana19 voiced 
opposition to Medicare, including during the very same Congressional hearings where Swenson 
erroneously claims that their voices were absent.20 (State chambers also did not appear to exist at 
the time in Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont.21) Why some clearly 
opposed state chambers did not sign onto the council’s letter to Congress we do not know. 
However, the clear opposition of several of these missing state chambers shows that states 
chambers’ nonappearance among the signatories does not indicate that they supported or were 
indifferent to Medicare. As a result, the council’s letter hardly provides “extensive evidence” of 
“enormous division” among them. 
<H2>Swenson: Business Week ran an editorial favoring Medicare. 
Vogel’s Fluctuating Fortunes cites a Business Week editorial that supported Medicare.22 
Swenson’s essay seizes upon this find, but it is difficult to know what to conclude about business 
sentiment more broadly from the opinions of the one individual who presumably wrote this 
editorial, Business Week editor Elliott V. Bell. Swenson asserts that Bell’s editorials were a 
“bellwether of business sentiment.”23 However, Swenson’s article offers no support for its claim 
that one individual’s opinions would reliably inform us about broader business sentiment, despite 
also rejecting that the opinions of a majority of state Chambers of Commerce are informative 
about it.24 
Moreover, a look at other business-friendly publications does not confirm Swenson’s 
suspicion that business publications were leading a chorus of support for Medicare. For example, 
Fortune ran a detailed article by Harold B. Meyers in May 1963 entitled “‘Medicare,’ the Cure 
That Could Cause a Setback”25 that criticized many of the proposed features of Medicare that 
were later passed into law, arguing for a means-tested, privately administered system with no 
taxes on employers. Likewise, the Wall Street Journal’s editorial page expressed concern about 
Medicare on multiple occasions.26 
<H2>Swenson: Business supported LBJ’s election in 1964 more strongly than they 
supported Kennedy’s election in 1960. 
It is unclear what we should conclude about business support for Medicare from this. Of the 
many reasons given for business’s stronger support for LBJ than for Kennedy in the secondary 
sources Swenson’s article cites, LBJ’s support Medicare is never mentioned. Nor is there any 
reason to think it would be: Kennedy also supported Medicare. 
The sources Swenson’s article cites do, however, offer many reasons beyond Medicare 
why businesspeople who did not support Kennedy in 1960 might have supported Johnson in 
1964 or acted kindly toward him as president. For example, Johnson was the clear favorite 
headed into the 1964 election; businesses understood there was “an excellent outlook for an 
overwhelming Johnson victory.”27 It is well known that businesses often donate to politicians 
likely to win reelection even if they do not support all their policies in order to gain access to and 
influence with them.28 In addition, Johnson pursued many other pro-business policies. As 
another example, Vogel indicates that the clearest explanation for the change in attitudes of 
many business executives toward LBJ was their support for the Johnson tax cut of 1964.29 
Likewise, the article in Fortune that Swenson cites—penned by the same Medicare skeptic 
Harold B. Meyers referenced above—indicates that many businesspeople supported Johnson 
because of his efforts to reduce federal spending, a sentiment that hardly indicates business 
support for welfare state expansion. That article likewise makes no mention of Medicare.30 As a 
final example, one of the other sources Swenson cites, a book by legendary journalists Evans and 
Novak, argues that businesspeople’s not unreasonable fear of a destabilizing Goldwater 
presidency is what led some of them to support Johnson.31 
More broadly, Swenson’s essay seems to imply that business’s stronger support for LBJ’s 
election than Kennedy’s implies that business must have favored all of LBJ’s proposed policies, 
including Medicare. This is obviously not the case.32 
Swenson: John Byrnes said Medicare would benefit GM. 
In 1967, an oral historian asked Congressman John Byrnes whether he thought “the attitude of 
larger corporations in particular” was “particularly hostile to the Medicare bill.” The historian 
named General Motors (GM) as an example—a natural company for Byrnes to speak to given 
that Byrnes represented eastern Wisconsin. Seeming to refer to GM specifically,33 Byrnes replied 
that GM was not “particularly hostile” to Medicare, although he thought they “had a rather more 
moderate attitude” than others. Next, Byrnes says that this may have been because Medicare 
“would have relieved” GM of retiree health costs, a comment Swenson appears to regard as a 
smoking gun for business support for Medicare.34 
Byrnes’s full remarks are less supportive of Swenson’s article’s argument, however. In 
the same breath as the words Swenson’s article quotes, Byrnes also says that “it wasn’t 
particularly relieving” GM and that GM thought “they weren’t going to gain anything” from 
Medicare because they thought unions would bargain for another benefit to be put in its place—
sentiments of equivocation Swenson neglects to mention.35 Byrnes thus appears to say GM was 
unique in being nearly indifferent toward Medicare and that it did not see clear net benefits to its 
passage. Byrnes also does not characterize GM as being particularly persuaded by Swenson’s 
logic about being relieved of their retiree health obligations. Byrnes’s interview is thus another 
example where a closer look at Swenson’s article’s evidence in fact undermines its case.36 
Finally, as a reminder, the broader question at issue is whether business indifference or 
support for Medicare was a necessary condition for its passage. Not only do Byrnes’s comments 
fail to demonstrate that business support or indifference existed to any significant degree, they 
fail to show that the relevant politicians perceived any such support or indifference: Democrats, 
not Republicans like Byrnes, were responsible for passing Medicare, and so it is their perceptions 
of business, not Republicans’, that are theoretically relevant. That one Republican who opposed 
Medicare saw one large business as possibly indifferent is hardly a smoking gun that the 
Democrats who passed Medicare—and who had favored it since long before Swenson argues 
that business interests shifted—did so because they did not perceive business as opposed. 
Swenson’s article offers no evidence that the congressional Democrats responsible for 
Medicare’s passage perceived business indifference or support, much less that they finally 
passed Medicare in 1965 because they came to have this perception in the mid-1960s—unlikely 
given that Democrats had been trying to pass the proposal since long before Swenson’s article 
argues that a business interest shift occurred. 
<H2>Swenson: Medicare was in large corporations’ interest. 
Swenson’s article seeks to sidestep the mountain of troubling empirical evidence for its argument 
by arguing that, instead of attending to it, “above all, facts about economic interests are needed 
to help sort out the tricky inferential problems involved in preference attribution.”37 However, 
with respect to the narrow question of Medicare, the article fails to engage in a thorough 
accounting of these interests—in particular, it neglects to consider whether the benefits of 
Medicare would have exceeded the costs to big businesses in additional taxes. Although 
Swenson’s article notes some of the benefits that might have accrued to some businesses from 
socializing their retiree health burdens, it never seriously considers what the costs of Medicare’s 
new taxes would have been, a necessary precondition for making a credible claim that the 
benefits would have exceeded the costs. Swenson argues that the benefits from Medicare to 
business grew over time as retiree populations swelled, but as Americans lived longer, the costs 
of supporting the Medicare program in taxes would have risen over time, too. 
 In support of the notion that Medicare’s benefits would have exceeded its costs, Swenson 
cites letters and memoranda from the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and Blue Cross Blue 
Shield that argue the Big 3 automakers would benefit from Medicare’s passage. The UAW and 
Blue Cross Blue Shield’s opinions say little about whether automakers agreed with their analysis 
of the situation. Given that the UAW was a strong supporter of Medicare, it is also hard to regard 
the UAW’s analysis of employers’ finances as objective. Likewise, Blue Cross Blue Shield stood 
to gain considerably from some versions of Medicare under consideration at the time, which 
would have administered the program through them. 
 It is also hard to square the evidence we do have with the notion that a business interest 
shift in favor of Medicare is what led to its passage in 1965. In particular, the very short time that 
had elapsed between when business-affiliated groups nearly unanimously opposed Medicare in 
late 1964 and when many changed their tune in early 1965 makes it implausible that a large 
“interest shift” was responsible for this difference in early 1965; there were no dramatic changes 
in economic conditions in just those few months. Swenson’s article argues that business interests 
were shifting in favor of Medicare during this time. It may or may not be that a Medicare 
proposal would have been less problematic for business in 1965 than in 1955; but any such 
gradual changes in economic conditions cannot account for why so many business organizations 
and their allies changed their new attitude about Medicare in the months just before and after the 
November 1964 election. 
 As a more general theoretical matter, considering Swenson’s argument that “above all, 
facts about economic interests are needed to help sort out the tricky inferential problems 
involved in preference attribution,” there clearly can be value in trying to understand what is in 
political actors’ economic interest. However, third parties’ true interests are often difficult to 
ascertain; entire subfields of economics are devoted to understanding the long-run, general 
equilibrium effects of government policy on firms, which often fail to reach clear answers. 
As an example of this difficulty, consider Swenson’s article’s argument that Medicare 
would have advantaged large businesses in particular by socializing their retiree health 
obligations, a burden their small business competitors had typically not taken on. It is plausible 
that large businesses would have benefited from retiree health plans being socialized, but it is 
also plausible that this would have damaged them. Suppose large businesses were uniquely 
positioned to offer retiree health programs because they could pool risk across a large base of 
retirees in a way small businesses could not, allowing them to offer a benefit that would attract 
workers from small business competitors in the tight labor market of the mid-1960s. Medicare 
might plausibly remove this advantage, undermining large business’s ability to compete with 
small businesses in the labor market. The point of this example is not to make a strong claim in 
either direction, but simply that it is rarely straightforward to ascertain facts about actors’ 
economic interests—and that it may well be much more difficult than ascertaining facts about 
their revealed preferences, despite the problem of preferences. 
Whether scholars’ judgments about interest groups’ economic interests should be placed 
“above” determinations about their revealed preferences as a general matter, as Swenson’s article 
argues, is thus not obvious and will depend on the details of the case.38 For example, in the case 
of Medicare, the historical evidence that Swenson, myself, and others have presented is very 
limited on the question of interests: it is unclear, and will probably always be unclear, whether 
Medicare’s benefits to large businesses were even positive and whether, even if they were 
positive, they were large enough to exceed the costs. By contrast, the evidence is relatively clear 
on the question of business’s revealed preferences: Businesses almost universally were not 
seeking to support Medicare’s passage. 
<H2>Swenson: Some business groups gave statements about Medicare to Congress that did 
not explicitly oppose Medicare. 
During Congressional hearings in 1965, when all expected Medicare would pass in some form, 
several business groups gave statements to Congress that did not explicitly oppose Medicare—
instead expressing no position in their remarks—but instead asked for specific provisions of the 
proposal to be changed. The NAM, however, remained explicitly opposed to Medicare in its 
testimony to Congress. Swenson infers from this difference in approach that those whose 
testimony focused on opposing specific provisions must have disagreed with the NAM’s 
opposition to Medicare overall.39 
This reasoning suffers from two flaws. First, it again fails to attend to the problem of 
preferences by failing to consider how strategic context might have influenced these actors’ 
expressed preferences. In particular, in making this point Swenson’s article again examines only 
testimony and expressed preferences from a time when a Medicare bill was assured to pass. But 
why would savvy businesses waste their limited time before Congress and risk damaging 
relationships with supportive members of Congress by expressing opposition to a proposal that 
was guaranteed to pass regardless of what they said? Even those strongly opposed to Medicare 
might reasonably conclude that they would make better use of their time before Congress by 
arguing for modifications that would reduce the bill’s negative impacts rather than engaging in 
the fool’s errand of arguing against the bill as a whole. Tracing how the very business actors 
Swenson names changed their stated preferences over time is consistent with this alternative 
interpretation.40 My previous article likewise showed that several other organizations and 
individuals who gave statements like these asking for modifications had indicated total 
opposition to Medicare just months earlier, in 1964, when Medicare was less assured to pass.41 
This shows that asking for revisions to a proposal does not in fact indicate that one favors it to 
the status quo. 
Second, to state the obvious, when political actors do not state their preferences about a 
proposal overall, one cannot simply infer that they support or are indifferent to the proposal. For 
example, Swenson singles out the California State Chamber of Commerce’s letter to the Senate 
Finance Committee that focused on expressing opposition to just one provision and does not 
state a position on the overall bill. Swenson’s article interprets this letter as indicating that the 
California Chamber was indifferent to or supported the overall bill. But we know that the 
California Chamber had opposed Medicare altogether not long before.42 
<H2>Swenson: Secondary sources claim business executives supported Medicare. 
This is an exaggeration. First, Swenson’s article cites three secondary sources—Epstein’s 
Corporation in American Politics, Vogel’s Fluctuating Fortunes, and a history of Medicare by 
Social Security historian Peter Corning—as indicating that the views on Medicare of rank-and-
file businesses differed from the views of the NAM and Chamber of Commerce.43 None of these 
secondary works cite sources. And none of them claim that support for Medicare was widespread 
or even common among rank-and-file businesses. For example, Epstein’s book merely says that 
opposition to Medicare and support for right-to-work laws were “cited as examples” by some 
“corporate managers” as reasons they did not agree with the NAM and chamber on every issue, 
but no sense of magnitude is given.44 If Epstein’s statements about Medicare and right-to-work 
should lead us to accept Medicare as business-supported, it should also lead us to accept right-to-
work laws as business-opposed, a dubious conclusion indicative of flawed reasoning. Unless 
Swenson seeks to disprove the straw man claim that not one person affiliated with business 
supported Medicare, these secondary works indicate little. 45 
Next, Swenson’s essay notes that a book published in 1964 about the Kennedy 
administration’s relations with business did not mention Medicare. Swenson’s essay argues that 
this suggests business might have been indifferent toward Medicare. Again, as earlier, absence of 
evidence does not constitute much evidence.46 
Last, Swenson’s essay cites an article in the Harvard Business Review from Harvard 
Business School Professor Theodore Levitt as indicating that some big business executives 
supported LBJ’s social welfare programs. That article, too, cites no sources and gives no sense of 
scale. It is also not about Medicare. Moreover, the editors of the Harvard Business Review even 
appeared to find Levitt’s claim so non-obvious that they inserted a special inset in the magazine 
describing his thesis as “controversial” and noting that many readers might disagree with it.47 
Not only do these secondary sources fail to provide the endorsement of Swenson’s thesis 
that he claims, other secondary sources explicitly contradict it. For example, in a different article 
published the following year, Levitt described Medicare in a list of programs he refers to as 
programs “business … fought.”48 Likewise, McQuaid includes Medicare in a list of income 
support programs he calls a “real Waterloo” for “organized business.”49 It is not the case that 
secondary literature describes Medicare as business-supported. 
<H2>Swenson: Surveys seem to indicate rank-and-file business support for Medicare or at 
least indifference toward it. 
Swenson cites two contemporaneous surveys: 
• Swenson cites a Chamber of Commerce survey of local chambers reproduced in Donald 
Hall’s Cooperative Lobbying.50 The survey question reproduced does not ask whether 
respondents supported or opposed Medicare, but asked them merely to indicate whether 
various issues were of major, minor, or no interest. The results do not seem to indicate 
that these chambers were indifferent toward Medicare. Indeed, only 131 of 400 responses 
indicated that Medicare was of no interest; slightly more, 134 of 400, actually indicated 
that repeal of 14(b) (of Taft-Hartley) was of no interest, regarded as one of the most 
salient issues to business at the time. At times, Swenson’s article scales back the claim 
that business supported Medicare’s passage to merely that business was indifferent; the 
survey it cites here in fact indicates that most businesses were not indifferent. 
• In my 2012 article, I cited a document the NAM prepared that indicated there was “strong 
opposition” to Medicare among respondents to a survey the NAM conducted of 
“American industry in eleven states of the northeastern United States.”51 Swenson points 
to a second page of this document, which I did not originally examine, that lists 
percentages under a heading reading “% of Business Opposition” with Medicare listed as 
“36%.” However, it is not clear from the document what this number means; presumably 
the NAM would not describe this number as indicating “strong opposition” to Medicare 
among the sample if it implied that the remaining 64 percent of respondents supported 
Medicare. It is thus difficult to know what to conclude from this document. As in other 
areas, Swenson assumes that in this gap in the historical record there lies support for his 
argument; but, in light of the vague second page of this document, it is more appropriate 
to conclude this document tells us little that is definitive. 
My prior critique of Swenson’s 2006 essay was focused on how organized business’s 
public statements might be misinterpreted, so I did not dwell on surveys of everyday 
businesspeople. As best I can tell neither Swenson’s arguments nor mine turn on the opinions of 
everyday businesspeople. However, as Swenson’s article dwells on surveys of such opinion, here 
I consider a more reliable source for it that is readily available. The 1964 American National 
Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Study asked respondents for their views on Medicare and 
for their occupations. Table 1 breaks out opinion among the general ANES sample, among those 
who identify as business owners and managers, and among only business owners. It shows that 
business owners were 15 percentage points less likely to support Medicare than the general 
public. Among the general public, supporters of Medicare outnumbered opponents by nearly two 
to one; among business people, opponents outnumbered supporters. This difference is 
statistically significant.52 
<TT>Table 1. ANES 1964 Time Series Study 
 General Public 
(Entire ANES 
Sample) 
Business 
Managers and 
Owners 
Business 
Owners 
For Medicare 49% 33% 34% 
Undecided, no 
interest, or other 
23% 28% 26% 
Against 
Medicare 
28% 39% 41% 
N 1,834 137 59 
Notes. Collapses those who say they have made up their mind and those who say they have not 
(there are few in the latter category). Percentages may not total to 100 due to rounding. 
 
These patterns are hardly indicative of a “cross-class alliance realignment … in favor of 
… Medicare.”53 One cannot conclude anything about the opinions of executives of large 
businesses from these data, of course; but what these data does show is that there was not support 
for Medicare among everyday businesspeople whose sentiments might have been missed in 
sources that tend to record elite opinion, such as the Congressional record. 
<H1>Discussion 
In conclusion, I will dwell on two lessons from our exchange. 
 First, substantively, Medicare represents a problematic case for theories of welfare state 
expansion that argue cross-class alliances between business and other forces like labor are 
important for such expansions to occur. Medicare is one of the largest social programs in the 
world, making its passage particularly important for satisfactory theories of welfare state 
expansion to explain. In a previous analysis of Medicare’s passage, Swenson argued that 
Medicare’s case strongly confirmed this theory, arguing that it only passed because of a “cross-
class realignment of interests in favor of something like Medicare” and that “a decisive 
constituency” in passing it “was also big business.” Swenson himself seems to have realized this 
analysis was in error, as his recent article at times revises this claim to be that “if there was a 
class war over Medicare, most on the capitalist side were non-combatants.” But even this weaker 
thesis Swenson’s article struggles to persuasively support. Although Swenson’s article promises 
to document “extensive evidence” of “enormous division within business” over Medicare, it 
offers no such evidence. 
Characterizing the positions of a group as large and diverse as business is never easy, but 
Swenson’s article offers us no reason to suspect that business’s hostility to Medicare was 
anything but widespread. The only evidence Swenson offers that businesses were indifferent is 
Byrnes’s comment that one business—GM—may have been indifferent, unlike other businesses. 
The only evidence Swenson’s article offers that businesses supported Medicare comes from 
uncited anecdotes in secondary sources that refer to a few scattered business players. This 
evidence may disprove the straw man that every single businessperson opposed Medicare. It falls 
far short of indicating that the presence of meaningful business support or indifference. 
 More broadly, the historical evidence also fails to support the key mechanism in 
Swenson’s theoretical argument, that businesses would favor Medicare’s passage because it 
would reduce their retiree obligations. Swenson has produced essentially no evidence that this 
consideration was important to businesspeople at the time, save for the UAW’s argument that it 
should have been important to business—even as John Byrnes explicitly indicated that GM did 
not see this consideration as particularly important. Swenson’s article also does not present its 
own calculations of whether the savings to businesses would have exceeded their new costs in 
taxes. Nor did it present any evidence that the relevant politicians thought businesses would later 
realize that Medicare was in their interests after it passed. 
 Second, flaws in Swenson’s empirical analysis also underscore the methodological perils 
of failing to explicitly account for the problem of preferences when seeking to understand whose 
political preferences are influencing political outcomes. First, as reviewed earlier and in my prior 
article on this topic, Medicare’s passage shows how strategic context can influence how political 
actors represent their preferences. Just as we would never mistake contemporary politicians’ 
statements of support for a policy as indicative of their true policy preferences, neither should we 
mistake historical political actors’ statements about their policy preferences as accurately 
reflecting their genuine views. Medicare’s passage offers a vivid example of this dynamic at 
work, given that important political actors dramatically changed their tunes within just months—
changes that were too large and rapid for changes in their actual preferences or interests to 
explain, but that the changing political context produced by the 1964 election can readily 
explain. My earlier article provides many examples of this dynamic at work by examining 
evidence from both right before and right after the election. Swenson’s latest article again 
focuses nearly exclusively on evidence from after the election. But, as I have written, to account 
for the influence of strategic context on actors’ expressed preferences, such as that introduced by 
an election, scholars must trace how actors’ expressed preferences vary as a function of changes 
in this context—just as scholars seeking to understand the impact of any other variable must 
trace the effects of changes in it.54 
 Swenson’s article also suggests additional cautions about how to accurately ascertain 
political actors’ preferences. First, Swenson’s article assumes actors’ expressions of their 
preferences must be exhaustive—assuming, for example, that when individuals argue for 
changes to a bill and do not state their position on the bill, that must mean that they support it or 
are indifferent to it. Examples clearly contradict this logic. Swenson’s article also relies on 
unsourced anecdotes in secondary sources for much of his argument; as I showed above, 
Medicare’s case also illustrates the danger this poses. 
 Acknowledging that the problem of preferences presents “tricky” challenges, Swenson’s 
article proposes an alternative, to analyze facts about economic interests instead. In some cases, 
such as in the case of steel tariffs, whether various actors would be economic winners or losers 
from a proposal may be relatively clear to both scholars and historical actors themselves. 
However, in many cases, the long-run, general equilibrium impact of a government policy on a 
firm is often very difficult for ascertain—even for the firm in question, let alone for scholars 
decades later. Medicare represents an example of this difficulty: Swenson’s article offers one 
rationale for why Medicare might have benefited large businesses, but it is also plausible that it 
could have undermined their interests by the same rationale. Swenson’s analysis also fails to 
provide an estimate of the costs of the proposal to determine whether the benefits exceeded them, 
perhaps because such costs would also be extremely difficult to estimate. As tricky as the 
problem of preferences is, in many cases it is eminently more feasible to ascertain political 
actors’ revealed preferences over policies than it is to reliably impute which policies would have 
benefited them most. 
Medicare is such as case. Turning to the historical record to better understand business’s 
own perceptions of its interests, a holistic read of Medicare’s passage as a case does not offer 
support for the presence of appreciable business support for the program—and little for the view 
that business entered into a “cross-class alliance”55 to help pass it. 
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